By Judith Curry

This week, I will be in Lisbon attending a Workshop on Reconciliation in the Climate Change Debate.  The Workshop was conceptualized by Jerome Ravetz,Silvio Funtowicz, James Risbey, and Jeroen van der Sluijs. While I (relatively) rarely travel overseas for meetings, I jumped at this invitation.  The topic is certainly intriguing and an issue that I have spent a great deal of time pondering over the last year.  Further, I really want to meet Ravetz, Funtowicz, Risbey, and van der Sluijs, whose papers I have been avidly reading over the past year, including citing them on a number of Climate Etc threads.

What has impressed me about their writings is that they recognize that climate change is not only a scientific subject, but also a political, economical, and ethical subject.

Postnormal science

The names Funtowicz and Ravetz are associated with the concept of postnormal science.  The issue of postnormal science is widely misunderstood in the climate blogosphere.  As per the Wikipedia:

“James J. Kay described Post-normal science as a process that recognizes the potential for gaps in knowledge and understanding that cannot be resolved other than through revolutionary science, thereby arguing that (in between revolutions) one should not necessarily attempt to resolve or dismiss contradictory perspectives of the world (whether they are based on science or not), but instead incorporate multiple viewpoints into the same problem-solving process.”

Detractors of post-normal science, conversely, see it as a method of trying to argue for a given set of actions despite a lack of evidence for them, and as a method of trying to stifle opposing voices calling for caution by accusing them of hidden biases. Many consider post-normal science an attempt to ignore proper scientific methods in an attempt to substitute inferior methodology in service of political goals. Practitioners advocating post normal science methods defend their methods, suggesting that their methodologies are not to be considered replacements for dealing with those situations in which normal science works sufficiently well.

Ravetz has clarified his ideas on this topic in the context of climate change in this essay at WUWT and response to WUWT criticism.

Von Storch has also discussed postnormal science in the context of the climate change debate:

This paper addresses the views regarding the certainty and uncertainty of climate science knowledge held by con- temporary climate scientists. More precisely, it addresses the extension of this knowledge into the social and political realms as per the definition of postnormal science. The data for the analysis is drawn from a response rate of approxi- mately 40% from a survey questionnaire mailed to 1000 scientists in Germany, the United States, and Canada, and from a series of in-depth interviews with leading scientists in each country. The international nature of the sample allows for cross-cultural comparisons.

With respect to the relative scientific discourse, similar assessments of the current state of knowledge are held by the respondents of each country. Almost all scientists agreed that the skill of contemporary models is limited. Minor differences were notable. Scientists from the United States were less convinced of the skills of the models than their German counterparts and, as would be expected under such circumstances, North American scientists perceived the need for societal and political responses to be less urgent than their German counterparts. The international consensus was, however, apparent regarding the utility of the knowledge to date: climate science has provided enough knowledge so that the initiation of abatement measures is warranted. However, consensus also existed regarding the current inability to explicitly specify detrimental effects that might result from climate change. This incompatibility between the state of knowledge and the calls for action suggests that, to some degree at least, scientific advice is a product of both scientific knowledge and normative judgment, suggesting a socioscientific construction of the climate change issue.

Where do I stand on the postnormal science issue?  I prefer to use the term “postnormal environment for science” to avoid the perception that proper scientific methods are being ignored.  The environment that brought about the behavior of Mann, Jones et al., the blogospheric obsession with their emails, and publication of statements such as those by Hasselman and Trenberth does not reflect a normal scientific environment, but rather a highly politicized one.  Scientists and others being labeled as “deniers” or “alarmist” is a clue that this is not a normal environment for science.

Climate science is fraught with uncertainty, as acknowledged Funtowicz, Ravetz, and von Storch.  The key point is the incompatibility between the state of knowledge and the calls for action.  The “call for action” aspect introduces the extended peer community, of which the climate blogosphere is a poster child.  So I think there is merit in this concept, provided that that postnormal science is not used either as an excuse to short cut the scientific method or to dismiss the science.  At the science-policy interface where the science is highly uncertain, understanding of the postnormal environment for science can help avoid situations of overconfidence in the science and keep the focus on understanding and characterizing the uncertainty.

Ravetz makes the point that the situation with climate science is a long way from the classic problems of the philosophy of science as laid out by Popper and Kuhn. Ravetz argues that there is a new class of epistemic problems that are dominated by uncertainty in the context of social and ethical concerns.

Towards reconciliation

I am hoping that there is some sort of path for reconciliation in this debate for the benefit of both scientific progress and social consideration of the issues surrounding climate variability and change.  I don’t know what this should look like, other than:

(1) Transparency and traceability in the science
(2) Loyalty to truth and the scientific method
(3) Understanding and acknowledgement of uncertainty and the possibility of error
(4) Win-win situations such as no regrets policy.

I know what it DOESN’T look like, and that is reflected by Kevin Trenberth’s essay, where the blame is put on the deniers, the media, etc. (everybody but the IPCC scientists and their supporters).  The domination approach only “works” if you can actually pull it off; climate scientists are babes in the woods when it comes to this kind of politics.  A partnership approach makes much more sense and might actually produce a good outcome.

I will be posting more on this topic after the Workshop (and possibly during); I look forward to your thoughts on this topic.

Participants

I just received a list of the participants last week, an interesting group to say the least.  A total of 28 people are participating.  In addition to the organizers, a number of names will be familiar to denizens of the climate blogosphere:

Judith Curry
Steve Goddard
Steve McIntyre
Ross McKitrick
Steve Mosher
Fred Pearce
Nick Stokes
Hans von Storch
Peter Webster

See this excellent post here. We hope Judith and the participants can make progress. Climate realists are all for an open dialogue and reconciliation. But the behavior of the alarmists/elitists make us doubtful. Please prove us wrong. 

Sabina Manea, UK Guardian

He wears a fine cloak, sword at his side, clearly a gentleman of standing. Behind him, representatives of the church expectantly peer out of heavy fur-trimmed garb. Once the money is paid (and it is, as always, a substantial sum), the gentleman’s transgression, be it on the battlefield or in the local bawdy-house, will be forgiven. This is how indulgences were bought and sold in the 16th century all over Europe. The Catholic church would dispense whatever forgiveness was necessary in return for cold cash, saving many tortured souls from eternal damnation.

Carbon trading does a similar job, whereby money thrown at developing countries can somehow absolve polluters from their sins against the planet. In a bid to encourage companies to reduce pollution and fight climate change, they are forced to buy credits to cover their annual emissions. The less pollution they produce, the more unused credits they can sell back in the market. Even better, people like you and me can get involved too. Flying to Barcelona for the weekend? Just click the offset carbon emissions button, and wipe away any guilt.

Carbon credits can be traded in the EU’s emissions trading scheme (ETS), but unlike other commodity markets, it’s not clear that carbon credits are tied to something that will have value tomorrow, or next year. Can the credits be owned, like a piece of property, or can they just disappear into thin air?

And disappear they may. The entire EU trading system was shut down last Wednesday, with credits worth 28m Euros missing following a series of highly effective cyber attacks that have plunged the still emerging carbon market into chaos. To make matters worse, the EU’s ETS is a serial victim; eco-activist hackers shut down the EU carbon exchange website only six months ago. The European Commission’s decision to suspend trading was taken in the wake of break-ins into online accounts in a number of European countries, with the Czech Republic being the latest casualty. The chances of recovering the stolen credits are slim, even more so once the criminals have sold them on. Unlike the money paid for indulgences, carbon credits are nothing more than records in an online account.

Where this leaves the man in the fine cloak is unclear. Those who dabble in the carbon market are vulnerable - whether industrial plants governed by the EU trading scheme or financial speculators wanting a piece of the carbon action. They thought they were buying real goods like oil or gas, which don’t just exist on a computer screen. Right? Wrong.

Whether the market participants actually own the credits like any other piece of private property, or whether hackers sitting in their bedrooms can just wave their wand and make them disappear, is something that the EU ETS is strangely silent on. This is despite the fact that the carbon market has grown to gargantuan proportions – worth 92bn Euros and accounting for 7bn tonnes in 2010 - and is the fastest-growing commodity market in financial history. But oil and gas are not hot air, and cannot be dissolved by a snap of the fingers (or a click of the keyboard). If the carbon market is to function effectively, its participants need to know what their rights are when they get involved in carbon trading. Simply issuing rights in air which may never be seen again is not good enough, and the commission should start addressing the dangers of a Pandora’s box that’s lying wide open.

On the other hand, if Europe were genuinely concerned about the environment, why should we cry over a few lost credits? Fewer credits in the market could do wonders for the environment, but would wreak havoc on financial markets, which could come tumbling down. But if millions of stolen credits flood the market, this won’t help in the battle against climate change. It may be time to think about scrapping carbon trading altogether. The commission should have thought of these problems when peering out of its fur-trimmed garb and pocketing the cash.

See more here.

By Andrew Bolt, Herald Sun

Wow. This world’s mad climate sure has got dangerous, if you believe this graphic from the warmist United Nations Environment Program (chart below, enlarged here).

Its Trends in Natural Disasters web page asks:

The statistics in this graphic reveal an exponential increase in disasters. This raises several questions. Is the increase due to a significant improvement in access to information? What part does population growth and infrastructure development play? Finally, is climate change behind the increasing frequency of natural hazards?

The answers to the first two questions are, of course, “in large part” and “a lot”, as Professor Roger Pielke Jr and Dr Indur Goklany’s work (see) suggests.

But then the UNEP blithely goes on to assume there is indeed “increasing frequency of natural hazards”. But, as hauntingthelibrary notes to its astonishment, the UNEP’s graphic suggesting this rise starts in 1900, when (if you believe it) we had close to zero natural disasters, followed by none at all the following year.

Can this be remotely likely?

Again, UNEP does hint on its graphic the obvious explanation:  that we don’t have “access to information” about disasters then that we do these days, when the whole world learns instantly about a flood in Pakistan or an earthquake in Baku.

But, wait. There is one other factor to consider that isn’t canvassed by the UNEP. It’s that the researchers responsible for this graphic didn’t even bother to properly check what natural disasters there have been in 1900 and 1901 that might contradict their preferred theory that climate change is making the weather wilder.

My evidence? It’s that with just half an hour of internet searching I have found several obvious natural disasters that clearly weren’t all counted on a graphic that is woefully, incompetently incomplete. They include some far more devastating that anything that’s occurred recently:

The deadliest natural disaster in U.S. history was the hurricane that ripped into the rich, port city of Galveston, Texas, on September 18, 1900. The category 4 storm devastated the island city, killing 1 in 6 residents and destroying most of the buildings in its path.

And:

In 1900, drought in India blamed for 250,000 to 3 million deaths.

And:

The Yellow River had flooded again in 1898, and in 1900 northern China suffered a severe drought. Some religious Chinese blamed the natural catastrophes on the foreign religion in their country.

And:

In Buenos Aires, Argentina, a heat wave [in 1900] continued into its second day. The New York Times reported that “There were 219 cases of sunstroke here Sunday, of which 124 cases were fatal. The thermometer on Saturday registered 120 degrees in the shade, with 93 of 120 cases fatal.”

And:

1900: The early part of this year saw one of the most complete monsoon failures in the north of Australia, especially in normally wet Cape York Peninsula where the year proved the driest on record at many stations. In February, a major heatwave and dust-storms hit southeastern Australia.

And:

July 1901 saw high temperatures in the Middle West [of the US] that resulted in 9,508 heat deaths.

And:

Ukraine has experienced years of famine...Crop failures and hunger led to great unrest among the peasantry in 1901-07 and stimulated emigration.

And:

But we know that [Australia’s] Federation Drought was especially wretched, wreaking some of its worst, most heartbreaking havoc between 1901 and 1902.

And:

Minor flooding occurs in [Tasmania’s] Huonville on a regular basis...Severe floods occurred in 1901…

And:

An almost 110-year-old record of river flow was broken when 1.034 million cusecs of water passed the Chashma barrage [in Pakistan] on Sunday afternoon. The flood has played havoc with lives and property in upstream Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab. An irrigation expert told Dawn that the highest flow recorded previously at the point was in 1901 when it reached about 900,000 cusecs. A large part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had been affected at that time as well.

And:

Kelut volcano has been the location of some of Indonesia’s most deadly eruptions… In 1901 ash fell at Jakarta and Serang 650 km from the volcano.

And:

In 1901 and 1902, ‘famine’ is reported from [Papua New Guinea’s] Rigo District and Goodenough Island, a ‘complete crop failure’ was reported from Milne Bay and the sago swamps at Cape Nelson burned.

See post here.